Theobald Wolfe Tone and the Common Name of Irishman in 1960s Ireland by Gillen, Ultan
1 
 
Theobald Wolfe Tone and the Common Name of Irishman in 1960s Ireland 
Ultán Gillen 
 
In 1962, the working-class Dubliner Cathal Goulding was elected Chief of Staff of the Irish 
Republican Army. Following the failed Border Campaign, republicans, under the leadership of 
Goulding and the newly-elected President of Sinn Féin, Tomás MacGiolla, set about rethinking 
their fundamental assumptions about ideology and strategy, leading ultimately to a split in 
1969/70 and the transformation from the Republican Movement to the Workers’ Party by 
1982.1 This new departure, which saw a turn to socialism, political, social and economic 
agitation, secularism, and anti-sectarianism, was rooted in a re-examination of Irish history and 
the ideas of prominent republicans of the past, especially the Marxism of James Connolly and 
the foundational ideas of Theobald Wolfe Tone, particularly Tone’s belief that overcoming 
sectarianism was the means to revolutionary change in Ireland. In this process, Goulding and 
others rethought not only what it meant to be a republican, but also their concept of Irishness, 
rejecting what they later termed narrow nationalism, and embracing a more pluralistic 
definition of what it meant to be part of the Irish people which aimed at mobilising support 
from workers of all religions and none. 
 
1963 marked the bicentenary of Tone’s birth. That year the Kilkenny man of letters Hubert 
Butler published ‘Grandmother and Wolfe Tone’, his review of the historian and journalist 
Brian Inglis’s memoir, West Briton (1962), in the spring edition of the Kilkenny Magazine.2 
Butler, a liberal and a Protestant, used the review to reflect on the position of what he termed 
the Anglo-Irish in the southern state, and on their self-image and their interpretation of their 
experiences in a changing world. While mocking what he saw as their provincialism and class 
snobbery as they declined in status and importance, he also attacked what he saw as their moral 
cowardice in refusing to confront the nature of church/state relations, an ongoing theme in his 
writings.  
 
Butler believed that ‘the Anglo-Irish who wish to express themselves freely’ had only two 
options. ‘One is that chosen by Mr. Inglis: “Go to England!” The unpopular alternative still 
remains: ‘“Go back to Wolfe Tone!”’3 Butler was explicit on the area ‘where Tone’s leadership 
is still needed’: ‘the absolute separation of Church and State’, as identified by Tone in the 
American Revolution.4 In Butler’s eyes, this demand made Tone ‘great’.5 Butler raised the 
possibility that unless the question of church and state was addressed there would be bloodshed 
2 
 
in the future, especially in the light not only of the history of Protestant persecution of Catholics 
in Ireland but also the international history of Catholic oppression of other religions, most 
recently during World War II, when ‘countless Lost Sheep of Central Europe were driven back 
into the Fold with a Belsen-model crook’.6 For Butler, ‘there is only one way out, the way of 
Jefferson and Tone. In the North, the Protestant Parliament for the Protestant people must go 
and in the South the separation of Church and State must be introduced and adhered to 
absolutely’.7   
 
This was music to Goulding’s ears. A fundamental part of his new strategy was to form 
connections with progressives outside his movement, especially people who might have 
influence, such as trade unionists, artists, musicians, writers, academics, journalists, civil rights 
activists and the like, as well as members of left-wing parties. This strategy was inspired by 
national liberation struggles abroad. Goulding had coordinated the establishment of a Wolfe 
Tone Bicentenary Committee, with Directories established in Dublin, Belfast, Cork, Waterford 
and Newry, and composed of people from within and outside the Republican Movement.8 The 
Directories included people of differing religious backgrounds, a deliberate decision designed 
to reflect Tone’s emphasis on the unity of Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter.9 On the basis of 
his literary reputation, his Protestantism, and his recent praise of Tone, Butler was invited to 
deliver one of the Dublin Directory’s public lecture series, on the contemporary relevance of 
Tone, in the Mansion House in the last week of September 1963.  
 
Butler’s lecture, entitled ‘The Ideology of Tone’, focused on what he described as Tone’s 
‘imperishable ideal’, the common name of Irishman.10 Butler later published the lecture in the 
very different circumstances of 1985, as Wolfe Tone and the Common Name of Irishman, in an 
attempt to promote reconciliation (what he called ‘unity in diversity’) following the New 
Ireland Forum.11 He added an introduction, but left the lecture itself intact on the grounds that 
‘my argument has not been affected by the passage of time.’12 As Robert Tobin has noted, 
Butler’s lecture discussed some of his ongoing concerns, ‘with Butler once again expounding 
upon the importance of diversity and neighbourliness in the construction of any humane 
society.’13 
 
As noted above, ‘Grandmother and Wolfe Tone’ identified Tone’s greatness as lying in his 
commitment to the separation of church and state. In the lecture, Butler said that ‘what made 
Tone great was that he had no ideology. It was he who first used the famous phrase, “The 
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Common Name of Irishman”, a name with which he hoped to supersede all the ideologies with 
which the Ireland of his day was divided.’ Butler then asked whether this phrase had any 
relevance for today. He noted that in Tone’s hand it had had the power of gunpowder, and that 
with it, Tone had hoped to overturn the Irish parliament and the British connection, as well as 
to establish an independent republic with help from Revolutionary France. Butler lamented the 
havoc the explosion had wreaked in 1798, and its long-term negative consequences for Ireland. 
However, ‘like a great inventor, who blows up himself and his friends with the things he 
invents, [Tone] had discovered something, which nobody had observed before.’ What Tone 
had discovered, in Butler’s mind, was the power of a secular Irish identity to overturn the 
sectarian stasis of Irish society, and thus allow for communal efforts to forge a better future for 
all the island’s inhabitants.14 For Butler, Tone had been somewhat successful in creating a 
common identity, and the need to finish this work remained urgent. 
 
Butler identified Tone as ‘the father of Irish Republicanism and also I think of Irish 
nationalism’.15 An ardent opponent of ‘the worst excesses of racialism’ as seen during World 
War II, Butler was keen to separate Tone, and Irish nationalism, from the Fascism that he felt 
caused liberal people in the 1960s to reject nationalism and forgo concentrating on improving 
their own situations in favour of what he termed ‘Broad Horizons’, ‘the fear of leaving a large 
world-wide community and becoming attached to a small and insignificant one’.16 Broad 
Horizons, in Butler’s eyes, caused people to neglect their immediate surroundings and interests 
through a false cosmopolitanism that was a hindrance to the improvement of their native lands. 
Butler stressed that there was ‘no tincture of racialism in Tone’s idea of an independent Irish 
nation’, which helped explain why Irish nationalism had not gone Fascist in the twentieth 
century.17 For Tone, said Butler, membership of a nation was defined by our country and not 
our blood. Therefore, membership of the Irish nation belonged to all those who thought 
themselves Irish, regardless of whether their ancestors had come from Britain, or their religion. 
Racial concepts that associated nationality with blood had nothing to do with nationalism, 
‘which is comprehensive and based on neighbourliness and shared experiences and a common 
devotion to the land in which you live’.18 For Butler the key to genuine nationalism lay in 
understanding one’s community and one’s history, and in cooperating with the people you 
shared your land with to improve all your lives.  
 
Nationalism in the north, Butler said, was ‘very sick indeed’, and he asked whether it could, or 
should be revived. He noted that for Tone, uniting Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter behind 
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the common name of Irishman had been the means, with the end being breaking the British 
connection. ‘None of this has much relevance today’. Butler argued that given how many 
people emigrated from Ireland to Britain, and how many joined the British Army, if ‘fighting 
against England or the north we should be fighting against our own people with a bitterly 
divided mind.’ In the modern world, the true enemies were ideas, not countries, ideas like 
Broad Horizons. It was better to concentrate on ‘the real world, small, personal and concrete, 
into which we were born.’ With this approach, ‘The Common Name of Irishman, which Tone 
forged so successfully, may still have the same power which it always had.’19  
 
If unity were achieved, what would it mean? It would produce a ‘vigorous creative polemical’ 
society, like that from which Tone sprang, to replace the ‘subdued’, ‘often dull’ and moderate 
world of the 1960s.20 Butler believed that partition, by disturbing ‘that equilibrium of forces 
necessary to a country’s happiness’, had contributed to ‘stagnation and emigration north and 
south’. As well as robbing the south of the ‘vigorous and rebellious element’ whence 
republicanism sprang in the eighteenth century, partition had caused the north to become 
‘smug’, and obsessed with Broad Horizons. Partition had left the south, meanwhile, in the grip 
of an ‘authoritarian church’.21 Butler, applying a dialectical model, believed that in a reunited 
Ireland, the disputes over matters like church/state relations, relations with Britain, and culture 
would ultimately be productive of both social harmony and a vital environment in which the 
country could flourish.  
 
How could unity be achieved? By abandoning Broad Horizons, by returning to the personal 
world of Tone, by interacting with one’s neighbours, developing one’s relationships with them, 
by recognising what the people of Ireland had in common and working together for the good 
of all, and thus addressing the problems that affected people on both sides of the border. 
Respect and affection would grow, and the common name of Irishman would take root. ‘North 
and south we would apply ourselves to a thousand urgent problems, social and material and 
personal, which since the death of Tone we have been taught to regard as parochial and beneath 
our dignity, and which we have neglected for 150 years. One day we should find that almost 
without our knowing it the border had gone.’22 The common name of Irishman thus offered a 
means of bringing Ireland into the modern era, by abolishing past dissensions and focusing 
minds on the here and now, while also avoiding its pitfalls. For Butler, unlike Goulding’s 
Bicentenary Committee, promoting the common name of Irishman was not linked to any 
specific political programme, but to a more general shift in social and cultural attitudes.  
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It might be tempting to interpret Butler’s presence in the commemorative lecture series as mere 
window dressing designed to provide a veneer of intellectual sophistication and cross-
denominational support to a traditional republican venture. In reality, it was much more than 
that. Goulding, drawing on Tone, was determined to break any link in the minds of republicans 
between Irishness and Catholicism. Goulding felt that both within the Republican Movement, 
and within Irish politics and society more generally, Tone’s dictum about uniting Protestant, 
Catholic and Dissenter had been paid only lip service. The speech at the 1963 annual Wolfe 
Tone commemoration at Bodenstown, the first of the new leadership, stated, ‘The main 
objective remains unaltered and the means of achieving that objective remain the same also … 
It is our task to win the confidence and support of the descendants of the Presbyterian United 
Irishmen of Tone’s generation.’23 The choice of Butler for the lecture series should be 
interpreted as a statement of intent to take Tone’s dictum seriously.  
 
Not only had ‘Grandmother and Wolfe Tone’ been unambiguous in its call for complete 
separation of church and state, Butler himself had gained a certain amount of notoriety and 
clerical condemnation for his writings on Yugoslavia, his perceived insulting of the Papal 
Nuncio at a discussion of the treatment of Catholicism in Communist Yugoslavia in October 
1952, and his intervention in the controversy over a football match between the Republic of 
Ireland and Yugoslavia in 1955. The powerful Archbishop McQuaid of Dublin had succeeded 
in having an invitation to the Yugoslavs to play in Dublin withdrawn in 1952, but another was 
issued in 1955. McQuaid called for a Catholic boycott of the match, citing the imprisonment 
of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac, Archbishop of Zagreb. Butler had controversially exposed 
Stepinac’s role in supporting the Croatian fascist Ustaše government and his participation in 
its forced conversion of members of the Serbian Orthodox Church to Catholicism during World 
War II.24 In picking a man with Butler’s reputation to speak on Tone on the bicentenary of his 
birth, Goulding and the Dublin Directory were sending a very clear message about their 
understanding of republicanism – faith and fatherland Catholic nationalism was not for them.  
 
The bicentennial lectures, especially the invitation to Butler, therefore represent one of the 
earliest manifestations of the path which the Goulding-MacGiolla leadership was set on 
following, one aimed at addressing the religious complexities in Irish society and the class 
nature of political and social power, north and south. They aimed to end the focus on the 
simplistic notion of “Brits Out”, and to challenge those who viewed unionists as colonists 
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removed from the Irish people. As Tone had aimed to forge a common identity among the 
people of Ireland to overturn the native elite and the connection with Britain, so Goulding, 
MacGiolla and their supporters hoped to use the same means to overturn both states in Ireland, 
achieve full independence, and revolutionise the social and economic system, by establishing 
a socialist republic.  
 
It was no accident that a lot of the innovative thinking that shaped this new departure was 
carried out under the aegis of the Wolfe Tone Societies that had been formed from the Wolfe 
Tone Directories. They were named after Tone not just because of the cachet his name had in 
republican and left-wing circles, but also because the Goulding-MacGiolla leadership 
conceived its programme as a return to the fundamental principles established by Tone, updated 
for the modern era. Where Butler stated Tone’s greatness stemmed from having no ideology, 
republicans located it in his founding a new one. The commitment to Tone’s strategy of uniting 
Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter shaped the approach of the Goulding-MacGiolla leadership 
in the 1960s, and its response to the crisis that erupted in Northern Ireland in 1969. The 
elaboration of what this programme meant in detail, and of the strategy necessary to implement 
it, took time, and was far from straight forward, especially given the resistance within the 
Republican Movement to this new departure. Nevertheless, its progress can be tracked in the 
orations given at Bodenstown in the decade or so after 1963. 
 
The 1964 oration, amidst much traditional matter, contained prominent elements of the shifting 
understanding of what constituted freedom for the Irish people, with increasing emphasis on 
control of the economy and natural resources. Tone was described as ‘undoubtedly the most 
original, persistent, buoyant and selfless patriot that ever led the national liberation forces in 
Ireland’, placing him not just in the Irish context, but also that of the contemporary anti-
imperial struggle of the Communist-led Vietnamese National Liberation Front. The speech 
offered a new emphasis on the history of republicanism, citing writings from Tone and the 
United Irishmen, and from Connolly and Pearse, to argue that the republicans had fought not 
only for independence but also ‘to establish a reign of social justice in which the finance, land 
and industry of all Ireland would be controlled and utilised by the Irish people for their own 
and their children’s welfare’.25 The same year, the Army Convention of the IRA agreed to 
discuss new proposals on organisation in 1965. The ten proposals, which had Goulding’s 
support, stressed the need for political, social and economic agitation, to cooperate with others 
on the question of control of economic resources, and to consider ending abstentionism.26 
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Although the proposal on abstentionism and others were defeated at the subsequent Convention 
and Sinn Féin Ard Fheis, the proposals demonstrated clearly the direction Goulding wished to 
take. 
 
A month before Bodenstown 1966, the Irish Independent printed an internal IRA document 
outlining a strategy for revolution that had been found by Gardaí on Seán Garland earlier that 
year. The ultimate aim of the plan was to build sufficient support north and south for a situation 
of dual power to emerge through the establishment of an alternative all-Ireland parliament, 
supported by radicalised trade unions and cooperative movements and a military force, and 
thus displace the existing state structures and effect the socialist revolution. To build such 
support, the open political wing must become the dominant part of the revolutionary 
movement, building its influence through agitation on a ‘radical social and economic 
programme’, and especially work in the trade union movement. IRA volunteers should receive 
training primarily in politics and agitation rather than the use of arms, and prioritise ‘a lot of 
unromantic and possibly boring’ day-to-day political work. The IRA would gradually reduce 
in influence and importance within the movement as the political organisation grew, while 
continuing to recruit from the ‘most conscious’ members; its focus would be planning for the 
ultimate point when force might be needed.27 The plan to create a dual power situation was 
clearly influenced both by Irish history in the period 1919-21, when the Dáil and supporting 
organisations had rendered the existing regime unsustainable, and the Bolshevik Revolution of 
1917, when the Soviets had first effectively shared power with the Provisional Government 
and then replaced it.28 
 
The 1966 Bodenstown speech argued that both the British government and the local capitalist 
class understood that if the people rejected sectarianism, their next demand would be ‘a just 
share of the wealth they create’. Both therefore worked hard to sustain it. To be true followers 
of Tone, present-day republicans must provide a realistic alternative to the status quo. That 
alternative was implementing the 1916 Proclamation, giving the people ownership of the 
country’s resources, civil and religious liberty, and equal rights and opportunities. Those 
present were told that although this might not be ultimately effected until the creation of an all-
Ireland government, they had a duty to advance this aim by encouraging agricultural 
cooperatives, by working in trade unions, and by becoming ‘active, hard working members of 
each and every organisation that is working for the welfare of all the people’. The oration also 
called for the nationalisation of key industries and large estates of absentee landlords. It ended 
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by reassuring those made nervous by all this talk of social and economic agitation and what 
they saw as plans to run down the IRA that achieving this goal would ultimately require the 
force of arms.29 
 
The speech outlined a strategy in line with the captured political plan, using some of the exact 
same language. The concluding part of the speech reflected how Goulding, MacGiolla and their 
supporters were trying to keep as many people as possible on board by reaffirming their 
commitment to certain verities while seeking to change the nature and emphasis of the 
Republican Movement as a whole. They hoped that over time many members would accept 
their programme as it began to bear fruit, while new members attracted by the socialist policies 
and agitation would replace discontented members expected to drift off.30 The formation of the 
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association in January 1967 following a plan agreed at a meeting 
of the Wolfe Tone Societies attended by Goulding in August 1966, was one example of how 
the new strategy involved republicans in a wider range of issues in cooperation with a broader 
range of forces. 
 
By Bodenstown 1968, the Goulding programme was much clearer, and support for it much 
stronger within the Republican Movement. Seán Garland’s oration displayed the confidence of 
the leadership in its position and the extent to which the re-examination of the history and 
ideology of republicanism had recast its politics. Tone was presented as ‘a Republican, a 
democrat, above all a revolutionary’. To Tone, revolution meant overthrowing monarchy and 
aristocracy and establishing a republic embodying ‘the essential human rights recognised in 
republican doctrines’. Tone also wanted ‘an end to the senseless religious bitterness between 
Irishmen, [and] that we all should recognise that irrespective of religion, we are brothers’. The 
United Irishmen had stated in 1791 that their aim was ‘the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest 
Number’ through political institutions based on the rights of man. Republicans today, said 
Garland, sought the same goal through the socialist republic, where the workers and small 
farmers, the mass of the Irish people, would control the means of production, distribution and 
exchange.31  
 
This Marxist language was not ‘glib phrases trotted out from some textbook’: ‘This is our 
definition of Irish Republicanism in 1968. It is the same definition as that of Tone, Lalor, Pearse 
Connolly and all the other countless men and women who sought to free the Irish people. We 
seek as they did to smash the suffocating stranglehold of both a native and foreign class over 
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our political and economic affairs.’ Addressing the internal opposition to the new departure, he 
stated that rejecting the fact that previous generations were social as well as political 
revolutionaries meant rejecting republicanism itself. The Republican Movement was not 
sacrosanct, but a weapon in the hands of the Irish people to attain its freedom. If it were not fit 
for purpose, ‘then we must ruthlessly scrap it and forge a new weapon to do the job’, whatever 
the ‘mealy-mouthed sentimentalist’ might say about adhering to traditional forms of 
organisation. He pointed out that in all successful revolutions, ‘the civil wing’ had acted as the 
‘mass organiser of the people’ through its agitations. The task for republicans was to lead the 
people in their struggles against ‘their enemies’, ‘their landlords, their bosses and their 
gombeen exploiters’, i.e. ‘the Establishment’. The oration concluded by citing Tone’s words 
about achieving independence by relying upon ‘that most numerous and respectable class of 
the community, the men of no property’.32 
 
The Goulding project, then, was founded upon a re-examination of Tone and his relevance for 
contemporary society. From the start, it had involved a commitment to forging the unity of 
Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter to subsume sectarian divisions under the common name of 
Irishman. By 1968, by looking at Tone anew from a Marxist perspective, the Republican 
Movement under the Goulding-MacGiolla leadership had reached the same conclusion as 
Connolly nearly sixty years before: ‘only the Irish working class remain as the incorruptible 
inheritors of the fight for freedom in Ireland’.33 Whereas Butler had argued that Tone ‘did not 
idolize the “toiling masses”’, the Republican Movement was now of the opinion that not only 
had Tone placed his trust in them, but he wanted a social revolution that would greatly benefit 
them as well as the bourgeoisie.34 Goulding et al saw socialist revolution as the modern 
incarnation of Tone’s revolutionary thought. When they spoke of uniting Protestant, Catholic 
and Dissenter, they now meant uniting workers north and south by raising their class 
consciousness through agitation and propaganda.  
 
The Republican Movement’s commitment to this new secular, socialist politics was severely 
tested by the sectarian conflict that broke out in Northern Ireland in 1969, and some members 
and ex-members, aided by elements within the Fianna Fáil government, established the 
Provisionals with an explicit commitment to act as a Catholic defence force. The majority of 
the Republican Movement, however, remained loyal to the Goulding-MacGiolla leadership. Its 
strategy throughout the Troubles would to a large extent be dictated by its emphasis on Tone’s 
belief in the unity of Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter, and thus the need to combat 
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sectarianism and build unity among workers of all religions and none. Having engaged in what 
it had described as a campaign of ‘defence and retaliation’ since 1969, on 29 May 1972, the 
Official IRA called a ceasefire ‘in view of the growing danger of sectarian conflict’ and in 
recognition of the fact that the “overwhelming desire of the great majority of all the people of 
the North is for an end to military actions by all sides’.35 It was argued that regardless of its 
intentions, violence objectively fed sectarian division. The next month, the Bodenstown oration 
denounced terrorism and announced the intention to transform the Republican Movement into 
a revolutionary party along Marxist-Leninist lines.36 Chairing Bodenstown 1973, MacGiolla 
described sectarianism as among the most potent allies of international capitalism in Ireland, 
and stated that ‘sectarianism cannot be and is not practised by anyone who truly follows Tone 
and it is a mockery of Tone’s philosophy for anyone to come here to Bodenstown and mouth 
phrases of pious resolution over his grave while preventing by their actions the very unity 
which Tone saw as essential’.37 The abandonment of the structures of the Republican 
Movement, the change of name from to Sinn Féin to Sinn Féin The Workers’ Party in 1977 
and to simply The Workers’ Party in 1982 reflected the embrace of socialist politics, but also 
a desire not to be associated with sectarian violence.38 While support in Northern Ireland ebbed 
away, the rejection of sectarianism and violence and the transformation from movement to 
party were essential to the electoral progress made in the south in the 1980s.39 
 
This electoral progress was also based on the political programme and practical activity that 
flowed out of the rethink of the 1960s. By the late 1960s, the United Irishman had become a 
campaigning newspaper, supporting republican agitation in the civil rights campaign, housing 
action, the Gaeltacht rights movements, and the ground rent and fish-in campaigns against the 
remnants of feudal property rights; in elections; in opposing entry into the European Economic 
Community; and in exposing the corruption associated with Fianna Fáil’s An Taca fundraising 
machine. In the 1970s, as well as campaigns for peace, a bill of rights, devolution, police 
reform, and against sectarianism in the north, major efforts were put into the daily political 
activity of the any electioneering party on the ground, as well as the Resources Protection 
Campaign, and the study of political economy. This work exposed the profits foreign 
companies made from Irish natural resources and produced a number of detailed plans for state-
led industrialisation, and ultimately the Irish Industrial Revolution (1977). Women from 
Official Sinn Féin were prominent in foundation of the Irish Feminist Movement and its 
activities in later years. The Irish People as a focus for weekly activity and propaganda. The 
slogan ‘Working for Peace, Planning for Progress’ encapsulated the sense of providing an 
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alternative vision for Ireland. The leading role played by SFWP in the tax marches of 1979 
reaped electoral benefits in subsequent years. By the early 1980s, Peace, Work, Democracy 
and Class Politics were the main themes of the political programme. The first TDs were elected 
to Dáil Éireann, where they made a point of speaking for workers and against the farming and 
big business interests they said ran the country, and of pushing for secularisation during debates 
on divorce and abortion. Political activities ranged widely but were always subsumed under 
the central theme of the interests of the working class.40 
 
In the decades after 1963, Goulding and Butler both articulated the necessity of completing 
Tone’s work of uniting the whole people under the common name of Irishman, but their 
interpretations of what that involved were radically divergent. The Goulding interpretation of 
Tone received its fullest ideological expression in Des O’Hagan’s The Concept of 
Republicanism, written for the bicentenary of 1798.41 For O’Hagan, whose militant 
Communism earned him a permanent moniker when denounced as ‘The Devil’ from the pulpit 
of a Belfast cathedral, genuine republican ideology since the time of Tone had been democratic, 
secular, socialist and internationalist. Where Butler saw Broad Horizons as damaging and 
something that Tone had avoided, O’Hagan celebrated Tone as a product of the French 
Revolution, and an international revolutionary. As they now identified republicanism with 
socialism, Goulding and his comrades believed that staying true to Tone’s republican ideals 
meant breaking completely with nationalism. Internationalism had become central to the 
politics of the Workers’ Party because it embodied the need for the workers of the world to 
unite, and because it helped to distinguish republicanism as understood by the Workers’ Party. 
The Workers’ Party regarded nationalism and unionism, whether constitutional or violent, as 
adhering to a fundamentally sectarian concept of politics at odds with Tone’s basic principles. 
Whereas Butler regarded the New Ireland Forum, which brought together the major southern 
parties and the SDLP, as a positive development, the Workers’ Party boycotted it, branding it 
an attempt to restore the primacy of the national question, from which approach flowed the 
‘reactionary politics’ that dominated both north and south.42 However, the commitment to the 
secularisation of Irish society which both took from Tone meant they still sometimes ended up 
on the same side. A few months before his death, Butler voted for Mary Robinson, the joint 
Labour-Workers’ Party candidate, whose election as President revealed the extent of social 
change in the Republic.43 The dynamism that Butler saw in Tone’s politics propelled the 
Goulding project forward until the world-historical overturning of the socialist states in Europe 
produced a traumatic split in 1992 from which it has not recovered. 
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Half a century after Goulding’s invitation to Butler, society north and south is much more 
accepting of varieties of Irishness than it was then, as the recent referendum in the Republic 
legalising gay marriage demonstrated. However, in both Irish states, the law and education 
provision still reflect to a great extent a religious vision of society. The number of peace walls 
in Belfast has risen significantly since the Agreement of 1998. The people of the island remain 
deeply divided. It seems safe to assume that were they alive today, both Butler and Goulding 
would continue to call for the people to adopt what Roy Foster has described as the ‘admirable 
and still relevant’ principles of Tone and the United Irishmen.44. 
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